

## Message Text

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DRAFTED BY P:JJSISCO

APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY

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TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PFOR, US, IS, XF

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH DINITZ, JULY 17

REF: TEL AVIV 4554

FOR AMBASSADOR - EYES ONLY - FROM SECRETARY

1. I MET WITH DINITZ ALONG WITH UNDER SECRETARY SISCO FOR HOUR AND HALF THURSDAY MORNING AND AGAIN FOR BREAKFAST FRIDAY. ALTHOUGH YOU WILL NOT WANT TO GO INTO NEGOTIATING ISSUES, FOLLOWING WILL BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON WHERE MATTERS STAND.

2. BEFORE WE GOT INTO NEGOTIATING ISSUES, DINITZ BEGAN BY READING FROM PAPER CONTAINING RABIN'S VIEWS OBJECTING TO EGYPTIAN ACTION ON UNEF. HE SAID IT UNDERMINED CREDIBILITY OF ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT. IT WAS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT ISRAEL WILL CAVE UNDER PRESSURE. IT WOULD INVITE TROUBLE WITH SYRIA AND UNDOF. ISRAEL HAD FOLLOWED TIMETABLE AS WORKED OUT WITH USG. THEREFORE FOR REASONS OF SUBSTANCE

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AND PUBLIC POSTURE, THIS ACTION MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR

ISRAEL TO DO WHAT IT WANTED TO DO, I.E., REACH INTERIM AGREEMENT. RABIN CITED ARMS TO JORDAN AND RECENT DECISION AT JIDDA ON ISRAELI EXPULSION FROM UN AS ADDITIONAL BLOWS TO NEGOTIATION.

3. I TOLD DINITZ THAT, WHILE WE DID NOT BELIEVE EGYPTIAN MOVE WAS WISE, IT RESULT OF MONTHS OF DELAY. WE ACKNOWLEDGED SERIOUS EFFORT MADE BY PRIME MINISTER LATELY, BUT EGYPTIANS DID NOT KNOW OF ALL THIS BECAUSE U.S. AND ISRAEL HAD AGREED IT WAS BAD IDEA TO PRESENT SADAT WITH PIECEMEAL CHANGES. WE HAD TOLD THEM ONLY OF GENERAL POSITIVE DIRECTION OF OUR TALKS. DINITZ ARGUED THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENOUGH FOR THEM. I EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT RESTRAINT SHOWN BY ISRAELIS IN RESPONSE TO EGYPTIAN ACTION AND URGED ITS CONTINUATION WHILE WE WORKED OUT SOLUTION. WE HAD PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY CRITICIZED EGYPTIAN ACTION.

4. ON UNEF, WE ARE TRYING TO WORK OUT AN EXTENSION OF MANDATE. OUR FIRST EFFORT HAS BEEN TO TRY TO CLARIFY IN CAIRO WHAT WAS MEANT BY EGYPTIAN STATEMENTS. YOU CAN TELL ALLON THAT MUCH, BUT YOU SHOULD NOT GIVE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE NEGOTIATING TERMS FOR EXTENSION OF MANDATE WITH EGYPTIANS BECAUSE THAT IS NOT THE CASE. ONCE WE UNDERSTAND EGYPTIAN POSITION, WE WILL WORK IN NEW YORK TOWARD RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD EXTEND MANDATE. USUN IS ALREADY IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELI MISSION THERE.

5. DINITZ THEN PRESENTED PROPOSALS PROMISED US IN BONN. I GATHER THAT THESE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN FULL DETAIL WITH ENTIRE CABINET, SO YOU WILL NEED TO TREAD VERY CAUTIOUSLY. IN SHORT, THERE HAS BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN EACH SECTOR, ALTHOUGH IT CONTINUES TO BE MODEST. WHILE I THINK WE NOW HAVE SOMETHING WHICH CAN BE PRESENTED TO SADAT, I STILL HOLD STRONG DOUBTS THIS WILL BE ENOUGH FOR HIM, BUT THAT IS FOR YOUR GUIDANCE AND SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE REPEATED TO ISRAELIS.

6. SPECIFICALLY, THE ISRAELI FORWARD LINE HAS NOW MOVED FURTHER DOWN THE EASTERN SLOPES AT THE PASSES. IT STILL BENDS SHARPLY WESTWARD TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE PASSES, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN BENDING IT A BIT

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EASTWARD SINCE YOU SAW IT AND I BELIEVE A LITTLE FURTHER MOVEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE. IN THE SOUTH, THE EGYPTIAN ADMINISTERED AREA HAS BEEN WIDENED UP TO THE ISRAELI ROAD, BUT THERE STILL IS NO SOLUTION FOR THAT AREA JUST NORTH OF ABU RODEIS WHERE THE ROAD CAN ONLY RUN IN A NARROW AREA ALONG THE COST.

7. THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF WARNING STATIONS AND U.S. POSTS

PRETTY MUCH ALONG LINES OF CONVERSATION IN BONN. I NOTED THAT QUESTION OF AMERICAN PRESENCE WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

8. EILTS WILL BE BACK IN CAIRO SUNDAY AND WILL PRESUMABLY SEE SADAT IN ALEXANDRIA MONDAY.

9. ON THE HAWK FLAP, WE DO NOT WANT TO ENGAGE IN WAR OF WORDS WITH GOI PRIVATELY OR PUBLICLY BUT YOU SHOULD IN WAY YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE WITHOUT GIVING APPEARANCE OF FORMAL REBUTTAL MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS TO BE SURE OUR POSITION IS UNDERSTOOD:

A. WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR RECORDS OF OUR DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION WITH ISRAELIS AT TIME OF LAST VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN TO WASHINGTON, AND WE CAN SEE WHERE A MISUNDERSTANDING MAY HAVE ARISEN. ATHERTON INFORMED DINITZ AT THAT TIME THAT WE WERE GOING AHEAD WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF EARLIER DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE PACKAGE TO JORDAN WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THREE BATTERIES OF HAWKS IN LATTER PART OF 1976, PLUS VULCAN GUNS AND REDEYE MISSILES. IN RESPONSE TO DINITZ' QUERY WHETHER THAT WAS ALL, ATHERTON SAID IT WAS LIKELY THERE WOULD BE FOLLOW ON ITEMS IN A LONGER TIME PERIOD, BUT HE DID NOT PROVIDE FURTHER SPECIFIC DETAILS. WE REGRET ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BUT CAN ASSURE ISRAELIS THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO MISLEAD, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN POINTLESS IN ANY CASE GIVEN FACT THAT DETAILS WOULD COME OUT WHEN TOTAL PROGRAM WAS FINALIZED AND COMMUNICATED TO CONGRESS.

B. ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT JORDAN HAS DECIDED TO UPGRADE ITS AIR DEFENSE AND HAS FUNDS TO DO SO FROM SAUDIS, SO QUESTION IS ONLY WHETHER THEY OBTAIN THEM FROM US OR ELSEWHERE--MOST LIKELY SOVIET EQUIPMENT THROUGH SYRIANS.

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C. WE DO NOT JUDGE THAT THIS PROGRAM WILL HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON THE MILITARY BALANCE, NOR DO WE AGREE THAT IT WILL BE THE ONLY, LET ALONE THE DECISIVE FACTOR, IN WHETHER JORDAN PARTICIPATES IN RENEWED HOSTILITIES IF THEY OCCUR.

D. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LONG RUN EFFECT ON JORDAN'S POLITICAL POSTURE AND ON OUR ABILITY TO ENSURE ITS CONTINUED MODERATION IF THIS SALE IS DISAPPROVED. WE SHOULD THINK THAT ISRAEL WOULD ALSO WANT TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR NOT BEING ABLE TO PROVIDE THIS EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN AND OF JORDAN'S GETTING COMPARABLE EQUIPMENT, PROBABLY IN THE LARGER QUANTITIES THAT JORDAN INITIALLY SOUGHT FROM US, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE. SO FAR AS

EFFECT OF AIR DEFENSE QUESTION ON INTERIM AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IS CONCERNED, WE BELIEVE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD AND MUST STAND ON THEIR OWN MERITS. WE CANNOT ACCEPT ASSERTION THAT THIS ISSUE RAISES QUESTION OF WHETHER U.S. WORD CAN BE TRUSTED.

10. FYI: HEARINGS ARE BEING HELD IN BOTH THE HOUSE AND

SENATE ON RESOLUTIONS TO BLOCK AIR DEFENSE SALE TO JORDAN, AND IT APPEARS THAT OPPONENTS OF SALE HAVE TAKEN THEIR CUE FROM ISRAELIS ON THIS ISSUE. WE ARE ASKING YOU TO MAKE SURE OUR POSITION UNDERSTOOD IN HOPE THIS WILL ENCOURAGE MORE CONSIDERED ISRAELI POSITION AND GET ACROSS POINT THAT FURTHER ACTIVE ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO THIS SALE IS NOT IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST. END OF FYI. KISSINGER

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